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PARTIES TO THE APPEAL
The parties to this Appeal are Gary Mathie (hereinafter "Appellant"), the
Plaintiff in the original action and Twila Gough (hereinafter "Appellee"), the
Defendant in the original action.
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JURISDICTION
This is an appeal to this Court taken from the trial court's grant of permanent
physical custody of the parties minor child to Respondent entered on January 31,
1997.
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(h) Utah
Code Ann. 1953, as amended.
ISSUES FOR REVIEW
A.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by giving give undue significance

to Respondent as the primary caretaker of the parties' minor child in determining
permanent custody when both parties had been co-caretakers of the child before the
Respondent was granted temporary custody by the trial court and the reason Appellant
did not have custody during that time was because of the temporary order?
Grounds for Review and Standard of Review
Appellant appeals the final order granting permanent custody to
Respondent at a domestic trial held on January 31, 1997.
Trial court Judges are accorded broad discretion in determining the
permanent physical custody of a minor child. Tucker v. Tucker, 910 P.2d 1209
(Utah 1996). Therefore, the standard of review of the Court is limited to a
review of the trial court's findings of fact for an abuse of discretion.
Additionally, the issue was preserved at trial. See Record at 226-227.
-1-

B.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it weighed the Appellants

prior criminal history against him and for the Respondent in determining his fitness as
a father when the criminal incidents occurred before the child was born and the
Appellant has no criminal history after the birth of the child?
Grounds for Review and Standard of Review
Appellant appeals the final order granting permanent custody to
Respondent at a domestic trial held on January 31, 1997.
Trial court Judges are accorded broad discretion in determining the
permanent physical custody of a minor child. Tucker v. Tucker, 910 P.2d 1209
(Utah 1996). Therefore, the standard of review of the Court is limited to a
review of the trial court's findings of fact for an abuse of discretion.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
There are no statutory provisions related to the issues at hand. However, an
analogous statute is found in Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-3(2):
In awarding custody, the court shall consider, among other factors the
court finds relevant, which parent is most likely to act in the best
interests of the child, including allowing the child frequent and
continuing contact with the noncustodial parent as the court finds
appropriate.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
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A.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal of an order granting permanent custody of the parties' minor
child to Respondent entered by the Honorable Jon M. Memmott on January 31,
1997. This case is before the Court today because the trial court relied on a
finding of fact concerning Respondent's role as the primary care taker of the
minor child for the two and a half years prior to the trial. However, up to the
time that the parties separated both parties shared in the raising and care of their
child. After separation, Respondent was granted temporary custody which
forbade Appellant from continuing as a caretaker to his daughter.
Also, the court weighed Appellants prior criminal history against him
when the incidents occurred before the birth of the parties' child.

B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Court Below.
The case came before the Honorable Jon M. Memmott at a Domestic Trial held
November 22, 1996 and January 31, 1997. At which time, the court, "by the
slimmest of margins," granted custody to Respondent. Record at 235.

C.

Statements of the Facts
1.

Appellant and Respondent had a child born June 4, 1994 out of

wedlock and have never been married to each other.
2.

Appellant has never denied and has admitted paternity during the

entire course of the child's life.
-3-

3.

Appellant and Respondent shared caretaking responsibility of their

minor child until November 1995. During this time Appellant would care for
their child from noon until midnight while Respondent worked and at other
times convenient to the parties.
4.

Appellant is and was at all times on permanent disability which

allowed him to provide personal care to the child and Appellant provided care
whenever it was needed.
5.

The parties broke off their relationship in November 1995.

6.

After breaking off the relationship, Respondent denied Appellant

visitation, forcing Respondent to have to resort to legal action.
7.

In January 1996, Commissioner Allphin, granted custody to

Respondent and ordered that Appellant be granted visitation which was to be
gradually increased over the next 90 days to the point that Appellant had
overnight visitation.
8.

In March 1996, just a few weeks before the 90-day period ordered

by the Court, Respondent decided to move to Idaho under the pretext of being
closer to her family rather than comply with overnight visitation.
9.

The Commissioner ordered overnight visitation in favor of

Appellant.
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10.

Respondent would only allow overnight visitation one or two days

at a time causing much disruption in the child's life as she was constantly being
driven back and forth between Utah and Idaho several times a month.
11.

In May 1996 the Court ordered week long visitations.

12.

During the time that Appellant did not have visitation he made

numerous attempts to contact his child by telephone. Some times he would hear
his child playing in the background, but Respondent would deny him contact
with their child.
13.

At trial Appellant testified to several alcohol related offenses

occurring prior to the birth of the parties' child. See Record at 65-70.
A.

Appellant was arrested for DUI on May 16, 1985.

B.

Appellant was arrested for DUI on December 12, 1986.

C.

Appellant was convicted of alcohol related reckless driving on
April 21, 1989.

D.

Appellant was convicted of having an open container of alcohol on
February 25, 1992.

E.

Appellant was convicted of Alcohol Related Reckless on February
25,1994.

14.

On January 31, 1997 after concluding the domestic trial, the Court

issued its findings of facts and analyzed seven factors.

A.

The Stability of the Parties.
i.

Both parties have exhibited a high degree of immaturity.
"[A]s to the stability of both parties, I think particularly as
to issues of maturity, I think both parties show a fairly high
degree of immaturity for their age." Record at 228. See
Also Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at \ 10 (A)

ii

That both parties are able to provide a suitable environment
and are relatively equal under a review of the standard
concerning the stability of their financial condition and
lifestyle. See Record at 228-229 and See Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law at \ 10(A).

B.

The effect of maintaining the primary custodial relation.
i.

"Over the past 2Vi years, the life of the child, the Defendant
has provided more of the minor child's primary care than
the Plaintiff. As a result it is in the child's best interests to
maintain the Defendant's primary custodial relation with
the child" Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law at ^f 10
(B) See also, Record at 232.

ii.

"I think it was clearly demonstrated in this case, however,
that the plaintiff has done more primary care taking in a
-6-

significant factor than most fathers would in this case and
has the ability and skill to provide primary care and has in
the past." Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at Tf 10
(B), See also Record at 232.
C.

Relative strength of the parties bonds with the child.
i.

Both parties have an equally great love and bond with the
child. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at \ 10(C).

D.

Relative ability of the parties to provide a suitable environment for
the child.
i.

The parties are of relatively equal ability to provide a
suitable environment for the minor child. Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law at f 10(D).

E.

Character and emotional stability of each party.
i.

The Plaintiffs five alcohol related traffic offenses cast a
negative light on his character.

ii.

The Defendant's character is more favorable when
compared to Plaintiffs in relation to the child's best
interest. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at ^f
10(E).
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F.

Commitment to provide care for the child and the relative
parenting skills of the parties.
i.

This factor favored neither party. Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law at ^f 10(F).

G.

Ability and willingness of each party to facilitate the visitation of
the minor child with the noncustodial parent.
i.

"The ability and willingness to provide visitation would
clearly favor the plaintiff in this case." Record at 234. See
also Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at ^f 10(G).

15.

In summing the factors the court reasoned that". . . two of the

factors [favor] the mother probably more than the father. One factor favors the
father probably at a significant level and all other factors being equal." Record
at 234-235.
16.

After weighing the relative factors the found made its ruling:

"Given those, the Court would find, and by the slimmest of margins in this, that
the mother is more suitable on the factors and would award custody to the
mother in this case with liberal visitation." Record at 235.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

-8-

The District Court abused it's discretion in awarding permanent custody of the
parties minor child to the Respondent. There were two ways in which the court
abused it's discretion. First, the court used the effects of a temporary custody order
and gave weight to Respondent having custody of the child prior to the trial. The sole
reason that Appellant was unable to share in the custody of his daughter during the two
and a half years prior to trial was because of the temporary order. From the time that
his daughter was born to the date that temporary custody was awarded, Appellant
shared in the upbringing and raising of his daughter as an equal caretaker. Utah case
law prohibits the reliance on a temporary order when issuing an order of permanent
custody. As the court should not have relied on the effects of the temporary order and
the parties shared in the caretaking of the child before the issuance of the order, the
trial court abused its discretion.
A second abuse of discretion came when the trial court placed undue weight on
the Appellant's prior alcohol related offenses. Offenses which occurred before the
Appellant knew that Respondent was pregnant with his daughter. Upon learning of the
impending birth of child, Appellant turned his life around and had no further offenses
related to alcohol. The failure of the trial court to take note that Appellant had no
alcohol related offenses in the two and a half years between the birth of child and the
date of trial was an abuse of discretion. The weight that the court put on this issue
went directly to the court finding that the factor of character favored the Respondent.
-9-

A review of the factors taking account the abuse of discretion by the trial court,
leaves six factors favoring neither party over the other and one factor favoring
Appellant. Therefore the case should be remanded to the District Court to review the
issue of permanent custody.
ARGUMENT
B.

Custody Under a Temporary Support Order.

The trial court abused its discretion in using the factor that Respondent had been
the primary caretaker when the sole reason she was the primary caretaker was because she
had been awarded custody under a temporary court order. Up until the time that the trial
court granted temporary custody, both parties shared in raising their child. Effectively,
the parties were joint caretakers until they separated.
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly ruled that temporary custody orders are not
to be treated as permanent custody. As the Court held in Tucker: "A temporary custody
order is only that, temporary. . . . It is not to be treated as permanent custody. . . .
Accordingly, this court has held that a temporary order should not be given the weight of
a permanent order." 910 P.2d at 1215-1216. The rationale for not giving a temporary
order the same weight as a permanent order is quite clear:
If a temporary order of custody were to be given permanent status subject
to Hogge ys changed-circumstances test, no party would ever stipulate to a
temporary arrangement and every hearing on temporary custody would
involve time-consuming presentation of witnesses, both expert and lay, as
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well as other types of evidence. In short, a temporary custody hearing
would become a permanent custody hearing.
Id at 1216
In the present case now before the court, the trial court clearly abused its discretion
by relying on the Respondent's temporary custody contrary to the rule in Tucker. In
reviewing the factors it considered in determining custody, the court ruled that for the
most part the parties were equal in all but three factors {See Record at 228-235). The two
facts that favored Respondent were:
1)

Respondent's custodial relationship with the child, and

2)

Respondent's character and emotional stability. See Record at 234.

With regards the first of these factors, clearly, the court should not have favored the
Respondent because she was the primary caretaker. As the Court acknowledged, prior to
the District Court granting Respondent temporary custody, both parties shared equally in
providing care for the minor child. Appellant did not choose to forego custody of the
child. In fact, he did all there was in his limited power to be an active part of his child
life. As the trial court pointed out, Appellant "...has done more primary care taking in a
significant factor than most fathers would in this case and has the ability and skill to
provide primary care and has in the past." Record at 232. Appellant's hands were tied
by the temporary order. The Court in effect issued a temporary order, without benefit of
a full evidentiary hearing and custody evaluation which gave one party temporary and
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then used the temporary order as one of the basis for denying him visitation. In effect,
it is the concern expressed in Tucker, supra to life.
The appropriate way for the trial judge to have addressed the issue of custody was
set forth in Tucker. Afer the expiration of the temporary custody period,
[a]ssuming each party remains fit and proper to serve as the custodial
parent, in order for plaintiff to be successful in seeking custody, she need
not make a showing of changed circumstances in the usual sense that is
required to modify an order of permanent custody. She need only make a
showing that an award of custody to her would best serve the interests of the
child.
Tucker at 1216 citing Boah v. Boals, 664 P.2d 1191, 1194 (Utah 1983) (emphasis in
original). Therefore, all Appellant had to show was that it would be in the best interest
of the child for him to be granted custody. The Court should not have found that the
Respondent was the primary caretaker.

The evidence was that before the Court

intervened, the parties were equal in providing care for the minor child.
If the factor of temporary custody is given it's proper weight, that is, equal to both,
Respondent is left with only the factor of her character and emotional stability in her
favor. She wins the benefit of the doubt in this case because she does not have the history
of alcohol offenses that the Court notes exist on Appellant's record. This is, in effect, the
flip side of that issue, which is addressed later.
The Court listed one factor in Appellant's favor. The court found that Appellant
would be able and willing to provide visitation to Respondent. See Record at 234. The

-12-

Court recognized that the Responded had systematically attempted to deny Appellant
visitation and tried to deny him the father/daughter relationship he was entitled to enjoy.
This was summed up by Appellant when he testified that the Respondent had wanted to
know when he would accept the fact that he was nothing more than a sperm donor. See
Record at 47-48.
Even with the errors by the Court indicated above, the court recognized and
expressed its knowledge of the relatively equal position of the parties. After addressing
and weighing the relative factors the court ruled, "Given those, the Court would find, and
by the slimmest of margins in this, that the mother is more suitable on the factors and
would award custody to the mother in this case with liberal visitation." Record at 235
(emphasis added). Taking out the court's reliance on the temporary custody order, it is
possible that the court would have come to a different outcome on the issue of custody.
The court in determining custody should look to the reason why one party that had
been a caretaker in the past had his or her caretaker status changed. Specifically, the
court should look at the "...reasons for having relinquished custody in the past." Sukin
v. Sukin, 842 P.2d 922, 924-925 (Utah App. 1992). Appellant in the present case, had
shared in the care taking of the minor child prior to the order of the court granting
temporary custody to Respondent. From the time that the child was born to the issuance
of the temporary order, Appellant took an active role in the caretaking of his daughter.
The present factual situation is not one where the Appellant decided to have nothing to
-13-

do with his daughter. Instead he fought the entire time for custody and access to his
daughter. Had the court not granted temporary custody to the Respondent, Appellant
would have continued to take an active role as a caretaker of his daughter.
Additionally, the trial court failed to take into account the fact that Appellant was
on permanent disability and would be able to provide personal rather than surrogate care
to their child. In Sukin, this Court stated that the court should consider the relative
position of the parties to provide personal rather than surrogate care. 842 P.2d at 924925. In the present case, Appellant would clearly be able to provide twenty four hour a
day care for his daughter. He is on disability and is unable to work. This disability allows
him to stay at home and be with his daughter. On the other hand, Respondent either
works or is seeking employment as a nurse and is unable to provide the attention that
Appellant can provide.
Considering the Court found for the Respondent by only the slimmest of margins
found in favor of Appellant on the custody issue, it is clear that the balance would have
shifted if the Court had not erred in viewing the Respondent as the primary caretaker and
failed to take into account that the Appellant could provide personal care, whereas
Respondent would need surrogate care

C.

Appellant's Prior Criminal History.
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In addition to the reliance on the temporary support order, the trial court also
weighed heavily Plaintiffs prior alcohol related traffic offenses. See Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law at ^flO(E). This is in fact the basis for the Court finding that the
"character issue" was in balance in favor of the Respondent. The Court erred in giving
weight to these old offenses. The dates of those offenses had an eight-year time span
from 1986 to 1994. The last offense occurred several months before the birth of
Appellant's daughter. After learning that Respondent was pregnant with his child,
Appellant actively sought and in fact did turn his life around to become more responsible.
No offenses occurred between birth and trial, a period of almost three years.
The use of the offenses by the trial court was an abuse of discretion as it related
to Appellant's ability to provide care for his child. In fact, the Court, as noted above
stated that Appellant did an exceptional job in that area. After the birth of the child,
Appellant kept his record clear of any similar offense in order to be a good father. He
learned responsibility for his actions. Appellant had no offenses between 1994 and 1997.
The reason for the court to consider alcoholic offenses is clear. In Sukin, this
Court stated that the trial court should consider the " . . significant impairment of ability
to function as a parent through drug abuse, excessive drinking, or other cause . . . " 842
P.2d at 924. Appellant's prior offenses do not effect or impair his ability to function as
a father. In fact the trial court specifically stated that Appellate was a adequate father and
at least as suitable a parent as the Respondent. As the trial court Judge stated: "I think it
-15-

was clearly demonstrated in this case . . . that the plaintiff has done more primary care
taking in a significant factor than most fathers in this case and has the ability and skill to
provide primary care and has in the past." Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at
^[ 10(B), see also, Record at 232.
Also, both parties were found to be able to provide a suitable environment and
were found relatively equal under a review of their financial condition and their lifestyle.
See Record at 228-229; see also, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at ]flO(A). The
court clearly viewed the parities as equal in their ability to care for their daughter. The
court admitted that Appellant had given primary care to his daughter in the past. But for
the temporary order, he would have continued this level of care. The above statements
are inconsistent with finding the character issue favored Respondent and should have
been held against Appellant. Without the character issue, the Court had to find that the
parties had one factor favoring each party. However, as shown above, the primary
caretaker issue is a red herring and should not have been considered as a factor in favor
of Respondent. Appellant and Respondent are therefore equal in their ability to care for
the minor child. In effect, there is no evidence showing indicating where it would be in
the best interest of the child to reside. The matter is evenly balanced, except for one
factor. The Respondent repeatedly interfered with the relationship between Appellant and
Respondent. The opposite was not found to be true. Therefore, with proper evaluation,
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all factors are in balance between the parties except the last. Appellant should have been
awarded custody "by the slimmest of margins."
CONCLUSION
The trial court abused it's discretion in awarding permanent custody of the parties
minor

child to the Respondent. In analyzing seven factors, the court found that in

all but three, the parties were equal.

The court found that two factors favored

Respondent: the effect of maintaining the custodial relationship and the character and
emotional stability of the parties. One factor was found to favor Appellant: the ability and
willingness to facilitate the visitation of the minor child with the other parent.
The Court erred in finding that those two factors favored the Respondent. The
Court erred when it used the effects of a temporary custody order and gave weight to
Respondent having custody of the child prior to the trial for the reasons set forth above.
As the foregoing discussion shows, Utah case law prohibits the reliance on a
temporary order when issuing an order of permanent custody. As the court should not
have relied on the effects of the temporary order and the parties shared in the caretaking
of the child before the issuance of the order, the factor of maintaining the custodial
relationship should favor neither party. Removing this factor, the court is left with one
factor in favor of each party.
The second was also erroneously found to be in favor of Appellant when the trial
court placed undue weight on the Appellant's prior alcohol related offenses. The offenses
-17-

occurred before the Appellant knew that Respondent was pregnant with his daughter.
After learning of the impending birth of child, Appellant strove to and did in fact turn his
life around. The trial court erroneously put weight on historical behavior not supported
by the recent behavior and failed to properly consider that Appellant had no alcohol
related offenses in the two and a half years between the birth of child and the date of trial
was an abuse of discretion. The weight that the court put on this issue went directly to
the court finding that the factor of character favored the Respondent.
Removing the weight put on the alcohol offenses and the primary custody issue the
trial court would be left with one solitary factor favoring one party over the other. Clearly
based on the ruling of the court and which is uncontested, the factor of which parent
would better provide access to the other party to the child for visitation favors Appellant.
A review of the factors taking account the abuse of discretion by the trial court,
leaves six factors favoring neither party over the other and one factor favoring Appellant.
Based on the foregoing, Appellant respectfully asks this Court to remand the issue of
permanent custody to the District Court.
Respectfully submitted this ' ^ day of February 1999.

David R. Maddox
Attorney for Appellant
•18-
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a copy in the United States Mail, postage prepaid.
TWILA GOUGH
Defendant Pro Se
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GARY MATHIE,
Plaintiff,

DECREE OF PATERNITY,
CHILD CUSTODY, CHILD
SUPPORT AND VISITATION

v.
Civil No. 944701877 PA

TWILA GOUGH,
Defendant

Judge: Jon M. Memmott

The above-entitled matter came before this Court for a
trial heard by the Honorable Jon M. Memmott on November 21, 1996.
This matter was not concluded on that date so that Plaintiff
would have an opportunity to present additional expert testimony.
Plaintiff's expert was unavailable on the aforementioned date.
This matter reconvened on January 31, 1997, at 1:00 p.m., and
additional testimony was presented.

The Court having considered

the parties stipulation concerning child support, having reviewed
documents, testimony and evidence on the issue of child custody
and having made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
hereby, ADJUDGES, DECREE AND ORDERS as follows:

Mathie v, Gough
Decree of Paternity, Child Cusotdy,
child support and Visitation

1.

The Plaintiff is adjudged the natural father of

McKinlee Marie Mathie, born to the Defendant on June 4, 1994,
2.

The care, custody and control of the parties minor

child is awarded to the Defendant with liberal visitation rights
awarded to the Plaintiff as follows:
Telephone

visitation

between

the

child

and

the

noncustodial parent, here the Plaintiff, should occur once during
the work week and once during the weekend-

The time for such

telephone contact should be as the parties agree, or 8:30 p.iru
The Plaintiff's visitation with the minor child should
consist of the first full week of each month for the calendar
year 1997 and 1999, until the child enters public school, and the
second full week of each month for calendar year 1998-

Holiday

visitation is to follow this jurisdictions standard visitation
schedule.

For every month that contains a holiday on which the

noncustodial parent is entitled to visitation, the one week
visitation

period

with

in

that month will be

enlarged

to

incorporate another day, making the period of visitation for that
month eight (8) days, unless the noncustodial parent elects to
provide all necessary transportation of the child incident to
2
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visitation

on

the actual date of the holiday.

Christmas

visitation should consist of one week before or one week after
Christmas, either termination or beginning on Christmas day at
1:00 p.m. Summer visitation shall be for the period of six
(6) weeks.

During this period the custodial parent shall be

allowed one weekend of visitation with the minor child.

The

parties are free to modify the above visitation schedule by
stipulation.
The Court orders that the parties maintain the current
allocation
visitation.

of

transportation

costs

regarding

the

child's

The Plaintfff should be responsible for receiving

the child at the home of the Defendant and transporting her to
the location of visitation.

The Defendant is responsible for

retrieving the child and returning her to Defendant's home
following the monthly visitation period or the summer visitation
period.
3.

Plaintiff shall pay $164.00 per month as and for the

support of the parties' minor child, pursuant to the "Uniform
Civil Liability for Support Act," Utah Code Ann. §78-45-1 sL seq.
(See attached Child Support Obligation Worksheet.)
I
I
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a)

Plaintiff shall pay child support, other than any

Court-ordered child care costs, on or before the 5th of each
month to the Utah State Office of Recovery Services (P.O. Box
45011, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0011), unless the Office of
Recovery Services notifies Plaintiff that payments shall be sent
elsewhere.

When public assistance is being provided for the

parties' minor child by the State, the ongoing child support
shall be awarded to the State of Utah.

When public assistance

is not being provided for the parties1 minor child, the ongoing
child support award shall be awarded to Defendant.
b)

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §62A-ll-403, §62A-11-501

et. Seq., and §78-45-9, if the Office of Recovery Services
enforces the child support order, Plaintiff's income shall be
subject to immediate and automatic income withholding as of the
effective date of the order, regardless of whether a delinquency
exists.
C)

Each party shall keep the Office of Recovery Services

informed of changes in his or her address, employment, income,
or medical insurance coverage.
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D)

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §62A-ll-320.5, each party

to this action may request that the Office of Recovery Services
review

the

determine

Court's

whether

child

support

a modification

order

for

this

of the Court

action

ordered

to

child

support shall be pursued.
E)

The

issue of any past due child support owed by

Plaintiff which accrued during a period when Defendant was on
public assistance shall be reserved and shall be determined by
further judicial or administrative agency proceedings.
4.

If

medical,

dental

and/or

optical

insurance

is

available to either party at a reasonable cost, the party that
can

obtain

the more

favorable

coverage

insurance for the parties' minor child.

shall

maintain

such

Pursuant to U.C.A. §78-

45-7.15 both parties shall share equally, (1) the out-of-pocket
costs of such insurance premium actually paid on the child's
behalf, and

(2) all reasonable and necessary uninsured medical

expenses including deductibles and co-payments, incurred for the
dependant child.
5.
necessary

If the Defendant goes back to school to acquire the
skills

for employment
5
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employed, Plaintiff shall be responsible and liable for one-half
of the reasonable child care costs incurred each month as a
result of Defendant's schooling or work.

Plaintiff shall pay his

portion of these child care costs directly to Defendant by the
5th of each month.
6,
for

the

Plaintiff shall maintain life insurance on his life
benefit

of the parties' minor

child,

when

it

is

reasonably available, and shall name the parties' child as the
beneficiary on said life insurance policy.
7.

The parties shall alternate, each claiming the child

as a dependant for the tax purposes every other year.
8.

The Court orders both parties to complete the Divorce

Education for Parents Classes,
DATED this

~7

day offtpSrl,1998.
BY THE COURT:

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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NOTICE PURSUANT TO RULE 4-504 RULES OF
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
Pursuant

to

Rule

4-504

the

Rules

of

Judicial

Administration and Rule 6(e) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the
undersigned will submit the foregoing document to the District
court Judge for signature at the expiration of eight (8) days
from

the date this Notice is mailed

to you unless written

objection is filed prior to that time.
DATED this

of April, 1998.
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a correct copy of the foregoing DECREE OF
PATERNITY, CHILD CUSTODY, CHILD SUPPORT AND VISITATION was
mailed, via first-class U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, this £c7^day
of April, 1998, to the following:

David R. Maddox
Attorney for Plaintiff
9160 South 300 West
Sandy, Utah 84070

ry
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UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
Paul H. Olds, #6777
Attorney for Defendant
550 - 24th Street, #300
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: 394-9431
Fax: 394-9431
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GARY MATHIE,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

v.
Civil No, 944701877 PA

TWILA GOUGH,
Defendant

Judge: Jon M. Memmott

The above-entitled matter came before this Court for a
trial heard by the Honorable Jon M. Memmott on November 21, 1996,
This matter was not concluded on that date so that Plaintiff
would have an opportunity to present additional expert testimony.
Plaintiff's expert was unavailable on the aforementioned date.
This matter reconvened on January 31, 1997, at 1:00 p.m., and
additional testimony was presented.

The Court having received

the exhibits, testimony, argument of counsel, being fully advised
in the premises, and good cause appearing, hereby rules and
enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Defendant was an actual and bona fide resident

of Davis County, State of Utah, for more than three months prior
to the commencement of this action.
2.

Plaintiff and Defendant are not now, nor have they

ever been married to each other.
3.

The parties have one minor child together, to-wit:

McKinlee Marie Mathie; born on June 4, 1994.
4. The parties have agreed and acknowledge in open court
that Plaintiff, Gary Mathie is the father of the above mentioned
minor child.
5.

Plaintiff was previously ordered to pay temporary

child support in the amount of $164.00 per month, and pursuant
to the "Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act", Utah Code Ann.
§78-45-1 et seq. this amount will continue until modified by
Court order.

The above amount is based upon the income of the

Plaintiff and Defendant.
automatic withholding

Said child support shall be subject to

as a means to collect delinquent and

ongoing child support, as provided by U.C.A., §62A-11-401 ££ seq.
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6.

The parties shall maintain health, optical, hospital

and dental insurance for their minor child if it is reasonably
available to either of them.

All medical expenses not covered

by said insurance shall be divided equally between the parties.
7.

If Defendant goes back to school to acquire the

necessary skills for employment or if Defendant becomes employed,
Plaintiff shall be responsible and liable for one-half of the
reasonable child care costs incurred each month as a result of
Defendant's schooling or work.

Plaintiff shall pay his portion

of these child care costs directly to Defendant by the 5th of
each month.
8.
for

the

Plaintiff should maintain life insurance on his life

benefit

of the parties1

minor

child,

when

it

is

reasonably available, and shall name the parties1 minor child as
a beneficiary on said life insurance policy.
9.

The parties should alternate, each claiming the child

as a dependant for tax purposes every other year.
10.

Concerning the issues of custody and visitation of

the minor child the primary standard used herein is the "best
interests

of the child."

In this matter a formal custody
3
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evaluation was not performed.

In an effort to determine what

custody and visitation scheme would best serve the minor child's
interests the court analyzed seven (7) factors.

The analysis is

as follows:
A.

The stability of each party.

Both parties have exhibited a high degree of immaturity,
relative to their age, concerning issues of the child's welfare
and neither party has exhibited strong characteristics toward
work and employment.

However, in general, the lifestyles of each

parties is stable.

The parties are relatively equal under a

review

of

the

standard

concerning

the

stability

of

their

financial condition and lifestyle.
B.

The effect

of maintaining the primary

custodial

relation.
Over the past 2 1/2 years, the life of the child, the
Defendant has provided more of the minor child's primary care
than the Plaintiff.

As a result, it is in the child's best

interests to maintain the Defendant's primary custodial relation
with the child.

However, the Plaintiff

4
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and ability to care for the minor child and has provided more of
the child's necessary care than most fathers typically provide.
C.

The relative strength of the bond between the child

and each of the parties.
Both parties hold genuine love an affection for the minor
child.

The strength of bond between each of the parties and the

child is extremely strong and therefore equal.
D.

The relative ability of the parties to provide a

suitable environment for the child.
The Defendant's smoking is detrimental to the child's
health and welfare.

The Defendant's family support, due to her

living in Idaho, is of benefit to the child.

The Plaintiff has

displayed a lack of sensitivity to the issues inherent in the
raising a young lady by maintaining in his home a calendar with
photographs of women that this Court deems offensive.

However,

the physical facilities provided by the Plaintiff at his home for
the minor child are excellent.

Under a review of these factors

the parties are relatively equal in their ability to provide a
suitable environment for the minor child.
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E.

The character and emotional stability of each party.

The Plaintiff's five alcohol related traffic offenses
cast

a negative

light on his character.

criminal record of any kind.

Defendant has no

Under a review of this factor the

Defendant's character is more favorable when compared to that of
the Plaintiff's in relation to the child's best interest.
F.

The commitment to provide care for the child and the

relative parenting skills of the parties.
An assessment of the evidence presented relating to this
factor favors neither party.

G.
facilitate

ihe ability
the

and willingness

visitation

of

the

of each

minor

child

party
with

to
the

noncustodial parent,
Under a review of this factor the Plaintiff has evidenced
a greater willingness to seek and maintain visitation between
himself and the minor child is in the child's best interest.
11.

The Court finds the Defendant to be more suitable on

the above custody evaluation factors and that, it is in the best
interest of the child for the Defendant to retain custody of the
parties minor child.
6
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12.

Telephone

visitation

between

the

child

and

the

noncustodial parent, here the Plaintiff, should occur once during
the work week and once during the weekend.

The time for such

telephone contact should be as the parties agree, or 8:30 p.m.
13.

The Plaintiff's visitation with the minor

child

should consist of the first full week of each month for calendar
year 1997 and 1999, until the child enters public school, and the
second full week of each month for calendar year 1998.

Holiday

visitation is to follow this jurisdiction standard visitation
schedule.

For every month that contains a holiday on which the

noncustodial parent is entitled to visitation, the one week
visitation

period

within

that

month

will

be

enlarged

to

incorporate another day, making the period of visitation for that
month eight (8) days, unless the noncustodial parent elects to
provide all necessary transportation of the child incident to
visitation

on

the

actual

date

of

the

holiday.

Christmas

visitation should consist of one week before or one week after
Christmas, either terminating or beginning on Christmas day at
1:00 p.m.
weeks.

Summer visitation shall be for a period of six (6)

During this period the custodial parent shall be allowed
7
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one weekend of visitation with the minor child.

The parties are

free to modify the above visitation schedule by stipulation.
14.

The court finds that the parties should maintain the

current allocation of transportation costs regarding the child's
visitation.

The Plaintiff should be responsible for receiving

the child at the home of the Defendant and transporting her to
the location of visitation.

The Defendant is responsible for

retrieving the child and returning her to Defendant's

home

following the monthly visitation period or the summer visitation
period.
15.

The parties herein should be ordered to attend the

Divorce Education for Parenting Classes.
Based upon the forgoing, the Court hereby makes the
following:
CONCLUSIONS QF IAW
1.

The Court has jurisdiction over the parties and

subject matter herein.
2.

The Defendant should be awarded the permanent care,

custody, and control of the parties minor child, McKinlee Marie
Mathie, born June 4, 1994.
8
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3.

P l a i n t i f f is the c h i l d ' s natural father and should

pay child support t o the Defendant in the amount of $164.00 per
month.
4.

I t is in the child's best interest that the Plaintiff

be awarded v i s i t a t i o n as scheduled above.
DATED t h i s

"7 ^ day of P&Srl, 1998.
BY THE COURT:

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

NOTICE PURSUANT TO RULE 4-504 RULES OF
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
Pursuant

to

Rule

4-504

the

Rules

of

Judicial

Administration and Rule 6(e) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the
undersigned will submit the foregoing document to the District
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court Judge for signature at the expiration of eight (8) days
from the date this Notice is mailed to you unless written
objection is filed prior to that time.
DATED this /O^^day of April, 1998.
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was mailed, via first-class U.S.
Mail, postage prepaid, this ffi^day
of April, 1998, to the
following:
David R. Maddox
Attorney for Plaintiff
9160 South 300 West
Sandy, Utah 84070
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1

custody to her would best serve the interest of the child.

2

And it specifically said plaintiff need not make a showing

3

of changed circumstances m

4

that she's had the child for the last year that burden is

5

being placed back on us, your Honor, and that's what their

6

argument is.

7

status quo is directly contradictory to the case of Tucker

8

versus Tucker, on a temporary order, your Honor, and I'm

9

hoping the Court will see that as such and view this as the

the usual sense.

Again I heard status quo.

And by saying

That argument of

10

first permanent custody order and look only at what is

11

the best interest of the child long term.

12

Honor.

m

Thank you, your

13

THE COURT: Thank you.

14

The Court will make the following findings and

15

rulings in this case.

16

is in the best interest of the child as was testified I

17

think significantly that there was no custody evaluation

18

done m

19

evidence that a Court should have, particularly m

20

of highly contested custody case this is m

21

many facts in dispute.

22

situation where the plaintiff got on and gave one set of

23

facts and circumstances and the defendant got on and gave

24

another set of facts and circumstances.

25

nothing presented in a way that would establish that one's

this case.

The primary stand of the Court is it

As a result, there is, really the best
the type

which there are

I mean quite honestly, I had a

And there was
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credibility is substantially any better than the others.
In fact, I think the Court's observation is is
that I think both parties explained the facts as they see
them through their circumstances and their eyes.

And I

think that both parties viewed themselves as a victim of
the other party in this case.

In fact, very significantly

viewed, and to the point it's almost out of control.
Because I was amazed, I have never had a case before me
where I have had so many incidents of police coming in to
enforce visitation on both sides.

Where they would go to

there and use the police or the police would be involved in
enforcing visitations or a call to the police officer to
enforce visitation.

And that does not seem to be

productive.
As to the issues, though, with the best interest
of the children, as to the stability of both parties, I
think particularly as to issues of maturity, I think both
parties show a fairly high degree of immaturity for their
age.

The behavior that is exhibited by both parties is

almost teenage behavior instead of adult behavior on both
parties in terms of how they are handling and dealing with
the situation involving the children.
There was raised certain issues, the work
situation, the relative abilities of the parents to provide
a suitable environment, I think also deals with stability.
228

1

I The defendant, Twila Gough, has been unemployed since

2

I January of 1995.

3

I home and so she is capable of working but, but part of her

4

! testimony is the primary responsibility so she could home

5

j and care for the child.

6

j could be with her family and provide greater care for the

7

j child and I think that a number of those factors are to her

8

I benefit in that, for taking care of the child and I know it

9

1 was characterized as moving back home as to cut off the

10

j child but I think there are some positive benefits from

11

j moving where she has the support of a family environment.

12

i

13

Prior to that she has worked in a nursing

She moved back to Idaho so she

MR. MADDOX: (inaudible) father (inaudible) the
child up.

14

THE COURT: Are we still arguing?

15

MR. MADDOX: No, your Honor, I apologize.

16

THE COURT: Thank you.

17

That the defendant, or the

I plaintiff in this case, his home environment, his living

18

conditions are very stable.

19

physical facilities for the child is excellent.

20

testimony was of neighbors and friends that the home

21

conditions are excellent, the yard provisions for the

22

children are excellent physical provisions for the child.

23

He provides, I think the
The

As to his own relative ability, he indicates that

24

he has a permanent disability.

There was some concern

25

raised by the Court or raised in the mind of the Court, he
229

1

indicates that he does, can do, and does a considerable

2

amount of umpiring and his physical disability is such that

3

it doesn't prevent him from umpiring, little league

4

umpiring, and those kind of things which is somewhat

5

j strenuous.

I've been involved as an umpire doing softball

6

games and others and there is a certain amount of strain

7

and it extends the Court's credibility a little bit to

8

indicate that he can do substantial umpiring for a number

9

of time and yet his disability is such that he can't do any-

10

type of work or light work or other work in terms of

11

providing long term for the child.

12

for the Court.

13

of testimony and ability to work but I think both parties

14

have not exhibited strong characteristics as far as work

15

and employment and those kinds of, in this situation

16

neither party has.

It raises some concern

It doesn't seem to be consistent in terms

17

Also, as to a suitable environment, that there is

18

some indication that testimony was that defendant smokes in

19

the car and home and I think that's detrimental for small

20

children if you smoke in the home and car where the child

21

is.

22

That provides a level of detriment to the child.
The Court does find in terms of suitable

23

environment that the character and emotional stability is

24

another factor that must be considered and the Court does

25

consider and believe that the fact that defendant has five
230

1

alcohol related offenses that would have some indication

2

J where charges have been made and there was one theft charge

3

I in 1992, the criminal trespass was dismissed, but I think

4
5

it is indicative of the disputes they're having over
j visitation.

6
7

MR. MADDOX: Your Honor, if 1 could just to
j correct the Court.

8
9

The plaintiff had that record not the

defendant.
j

THE COURT: That's correct.

The plaintiff had the

10

I record and I think he's to be commended that it has changed

11

| but I still think that life style character, it's part of

12

| his character and life style.

I think there has been an

13

explanation as to the calendar and the concern of the

14

calendar had to do with the sensitivity, his sensitivity to

15

those factors in relation to long term, if I'm going to

16

award custody in bringing up a young lady, sensitivity to

17

those issues of having and presently those.

18

exhibited a lack of sensitivity which would affect, some

19

effect on the character of the plaintiff.

20
21

And I think it

The commitment to providing custodial parent and
j providing needs of the child both were excellent.

Very

22

strong, I think they are both very concerned in providing

23

for the needs of the child.

24
25

The relative strength in the parental bonds, they
are both extremely strong.

I think both parents testimony,
231

1

j their attachment to their young girl is very strong and

2

| that is to be commended with both parents.

3

I

4

j that factor in and of itself favors the defendant in this

5

| case.

6

| the testimony, that the defendant has provided more of the

7

j primary care taking of custodial care.

8

i clearly demonstrated in this case, however, that the

9

! plaintiff has done more primary care taking in a

Maintaining primary custodial bond, I think that

That over the last two-and-a-half years, based on

I think it was

10

i significant factor than most fathers would in this case and

11

j has the ability and skill to provide primary care and has

12

j in the past.

13

J

As to the issues of visitation.

There are

14

examples in this case and this is a very difficult case for

15

the Court to deal with in terms of a relationship where

16

it's a paternity action and as a result while there was, as

17

least for a short period, there was some physical ties,

18

there doesn't seem to appear to be any significant

19
20

j emotional ties between these parties in terms of a family
and parental relation and as a result that is going to

21

I cause, I think, emotional feelings and circumstances that

22

| make it much more difficult to deal with the child than in

23

a marital relation.

The fact that it may have the same

24

I consequence to the child, I think, is true.

However, the

25

| impact on both the parties in dealing with each other is a
232

much more difficult situation, I think in a paternity
situation, in their own minds where there are not any type
of feelings and relations.

So, I think there is going to

be in and of itself, much greater conflict.
And I think in listening uo the testimony of both
of the parlies that the defendant's testimony was, you know
allowing visitation of my child and the view of the child
being hers.

Where also the plaintiff's testimony was that

the actions were in reference to what she, Twila, was doing
to me.

In terms of what was happening with visitation was

what was happening to the plaintiff, not what was happening
to the child and so the actions that were taken that he was
and the motive and the background was what it was doing to
him not what it was doing to the child.

So that both

parties were looking at this in a situation of involving
their own personal interest and investment in the situation
with neither party, based on the testimony that I have
heard, taking or viewing the primary consideration of the
child in this case. I donft think either party's testimony
or background exhibited that their primary interest or the
primary concern in viewing the visitation problems was the
child but it was how it affected them personally in the
situation and I don't think that that's in the best
interests of the child.
Given these factors and findings, I think that
233

1
2

the stability is really, of homes, is equal.

The

J maintaining of primary custodial relationship that has
historically gone on would favor with the mother.

The

4

I relative strength of parental bonds is relatively equal.

5

| The relative ability of the parent to provide to a suitable

6

| environment is likewise equal.

7

j stability, I think would favor the mother in this case.

The character and emotional

The commitment to provide parenting skills would favor
9
10

I neither.

The ability and willingness to provide visitation

| would clearly favor the plaintiff in this case.

So, the

issue is, I think, -12

j

MR. OLDS:

What was that last?

I'm sorry, your

Honor.
14
15

THE COURT:

Ability and willingness to provide

visitation.

16

MR. OLDS:

17

THE COURT: -- would clearly favor the defendant

18

Okay, I'm sorry.

or the plaintiff in this case.

And so, you have a

19

I situation, I think, where two of the factors favor the

20

J mother probably more than that father.

21

j the father probably at a significant level and all other

22

j factors being equal.

23
24
25

One factor favors

Now on that basis, then the Court is being asked
to make a decision of custody.

And it is almost a Soloman

J decision, okay, we are going to cut the baby in half kind
234

of situation because the factors come out to be in some
relatively equal.

Given those, the Court would find, and

by th^slimmest of margins in this, that the mother is more
4

j suitable on the factors and would award custody to the

5

j mother in this case with liberal visitation.

6

i

7

| structured fashion and the Court, where she's in Idaho, and

8

| the transportation of neither party working, I mean there

9

j isn't significant income, I mean transportation is always

I think we need to deal with visitation in a very

10

I going to be a significant problem.

I think until the child

11

j starts school that would allow the plaintiff to have his

12

I weeks visitation plus any holidays that would fall during

13

j that month that he has a weeks visitation.

So, that if

14

there is one holiday, you would add the holiday on to his

15

visitation.

If there are two holidays, you would add the

16

j two days on.

And then I would allow in addition to that

17

very liberal extended summer visitation so that he would

18

I have a period of six weeks during the summer of visitation

19

of the child and during that six weeks that the plaintiff

20

I would then have one weekend --

21

|

MR. OLDS: Do you mean defendant?

22

|

THE COURT: Yes, defendant would have during that

23
24
25

period of time one weekend that could be arranged somewhere
I in the middle, the third, fourth, or fifth week that she
could have the child for one weekend.

The rest of the time
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